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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1807 the United States Congress passed legislation, which
became effective on January 1, 1808, to end all importations of slaves
into the United States.1 Even before that date, Congress had passed a
series of laws that prevented Americans from participating in the trade
as sailors, ship captains, ship owners, ship builders, or investors in slave
trading ventures.2 The bicentennial of the closing of the trade to the
United States provides an appropriate moment to examine how the
United States withdrew from this form of commerce.
At one level the tale is inspiring. This was the first time in history
that a slaveholding society voluntarily ceased to import new slaves.3 At
another level, this is a cautionary, but nevertheless instructive, tale about
how to use law to effectuate social change. Starting in 1794, the United
States Congress passed a series of laws aimed at preventing Americans
from participating in the trade.4 After the 1807 law went into effect, the
United States passed a handful of other laws to strengthen the ban and
make it more effective.5 In short, Congress did not successfully end the
trade on its first try, or its second or even its third; but building on each
legislative attempt, Congress eventually closed the trade to all but the
most intrepid smugglers.6
Finally, an examination of the attempts to end the African Slave
Trade may help policymakers and social activists deal with the modern
problem of human trafficking. Modern human trafficking is not the
same as the African trade, despite the use of the term “slavery” by
activists who campaign against trafficking.7 The often grotesque
exploitation of people who have been trafficked in recent years is only

1. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
2. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70
(1800); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803).
3. Great Britain passed legislation to ban the trade a few weeks after the United States did
and that law went into effect a few months before the American law. An Act for the Abolition of
the Slave Trade, 47 Geo III Sess. 1 c. 36. However, while Britain was heavily involved in the
African trade to other places, no slaves were being imported into the British Isles. See James
Walvin, Great Britain, African Slavery, in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, 17677 (Paul Finkelman & Joseph C. Miller eds., 1998).
4. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70
(1800); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803).
5. See infra Part VI(B)-(C).
6. See infra Part V.
7. Nancy G. Abudu et al., Human Rights, 42 INT’L LAW. 755, 775 (2008) (quoting U.S.
Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice: “[t]rafficking in persons is a modern-day form of slavery, a
new type of global slave trade”).
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superficially similar to slavery in the Americas in the 18th and 19th
centuries. Three critical differences between then and now stand out.
First, the African slave trade was legal for more than 350 years in
some Western countries, their American colonies, and the nations that
emerged from those colonies. The African slave trade was legal in what
became the United States for nearly 200 years–from the 1620s when
African slaves began to arrive in the Dutch and British colonies until
1808 when the law banning the trade went into effect. Today, human
trafficking is illegal everywhere in the world.8 Similarly, the slave trade
was legal in countries along the west coast of Africa, where most slaves
were put on ships for the New World. Thus, the local governments in
Africa supported the trade, participated in it, sanctioned it, taxed it, and
profited from it in many ways. No modern nations sanction or support
the trafficking of their own citizens or of non-citizens within their
jurisdiction.
Second, even after the African slave trade was banned, slavery
itself was still legal in the United States, most of the British New World
colonies,9 and in the Spanish colonies. Thus, if someone could
successfully smuggle a slave into the United States–either from Africa or
the Caribbean–that slave could, to some extent, disappear into the
existing slave population. Trafficked persons are rarely held in legally
sanctioned conditions upon arrival at their destination. Similarly, a slave
illegally brought to the US would have no reason to know or believe that
he or she had a legal claim to freedom and could ask for protection from
the government. But, trafficked people are likely to know that they have
a right to their freedom. Put simply, slavery was legal in the United
States, even after importations were not; but trafficking in people has
never been legal and the exploitation of trafficked people is equally
against the law.
Finally, some people caught up in the web of modern trafficking
voluntarily seek transportation to their destination, and may even be
“willing victims” of trafficking because of their desperate desire to reach
the United States, England, or some other western country.10 These
8. James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking”, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2008); see also Jennifer S. Nam, The Case of The Missing Case: Examining The Civil
Right of Action For Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2007).
9. England did not end slavery in its New World colonies until 1833. See Howard
Temperly, Emancipation Act, British (1833), in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY,
supra note 3, at 293. Slavery remained legal in the United States until the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
10. Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L. J. 207, 218 (2007).
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“willing victims” of trafficking are similar to some indentured servants
of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, who voluntarily agreed
to a limited form of servitude in exchange for transportation to the
American colonies, only to discover when they arrived that their new
situation was horrendous and exploitative beyond anything they had
expected.11 However, no one in Africa ever voluntarily agreed to be
transported to the Americas as a slave, and all slaves came to America
under the most horrifying of conditions–almost always in chains.12
Yet, despite the many differences between the African slave trade
and modern trafficking, those working to end trafficking may find both
inspiration and tactical utility in examining how we came to abolish and
suppress the African trade.
II. COLONIAL REGULATIONS OF THE SLAVE TRADE
Before the American Revolution, both the colonies and Great
Britain regulated the African slave trade to what later became the United
States. In fact, the British government gave special protection to the
Royal African Company, which brought more slaves to the American
colonies than any other single entity.13 Investors in the Royal African
Company reached the highest echelons of British society, and included
members of the Royal family.14 Even after the demise of the Royal
African Company in 1750, the slave trade continued to be an important
part of Britain’s mercantile policy. Britain collected taxes on imported
slaves while merchants in the metropolis made their fortunes.15
In the colonies the slave trade was a source of labor, profits, and
local tax revenues. But for both economic and prudential reasons,
colonial governments occasionally sought to limit importations. In
1698, for example, the South Carolina legislature concluded that “the
great number of Negroes which of late have been imported into this

11. See ABBOTT EMERSON SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND
CONVICT LABOR IN AMERICA 9-10, 253-54, 257, 259 (1947).
12. JOSEPH C. MILLER, WAY OF DEATH: MERCHANT CAPITALISM AND THE ANGOLAN SLAVE
TRADE, 1730-1830, at 413 (1996) (describing the conditions aboard slave ships).
13. King Charles II and other royal family members invested in the Royal African Company
(RAC). The investors not only provided the RAC with “the protection of royal privileges,” but also
allowed the RAC to develop a monopoly on the early phase of the slave trade by providing the RAC
with significant financing. This monopoly effectively ended in 1698. Joseph C. Miller, Royal
African Company, in MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, supra note 3, at 780-81.
14. Id.; HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE,
1440-1870, at 241 (1997). DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE
131-32 (1966).
15. THOMAS, supra note 14; DAVIS, supra note 14.
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Collony may endanger the safety thereof.”16 This law did not limit the
trade, but rather, was designed to encourage the importation of white
servants.17 It had virtually no impact on the growth of the black
population, which by 1708 exceeded the white population.18
Fearful of its growing black majority, in 1717 South Carolina
imposed a tax of £40 per slave, virtually shutting down the trade,19 but
two years later the legislature reduced the tax to £10 for every new slave
brought from Africa,20 and the trade boomed.21 In 1740, in response to
the Stono Rebellion of 1739, South Carolina passed a new tax law that
was designed to end the trade in the near future.22 For the first fifteen
months after the law was adopted, South Carolinians would continue to
pay the £10 duty for every slave imported into the colony.23 Then, for a
three-year period, the colony would impose a £100 tax on every adult
slave imported from Africa, which would effectively end the trade.24
The law recited the “very dangerous consequence to the peace and
safety” of the colony from the “barbarous and savage disposition” of
Africans.”25 Despite the “dangerous consequences” of importing new
slaves, the legislature did not end importations immediately, possibly out
of fear of unfairness to both slavers already on the way to South
Carolina, and masters who desperately needed more slaves. This fifteenmonth delay in implementing the £100 tax allowed for an orderly
transition away from massive importations into the colony. In any
event, the law expired in 1744 and the colonists could once again import
slaves without facing prohibitive duties. In 1760, South Carolina
attempted to ban the trade outright because the colonists feared the
growing number of African-born slaves, but Royal authorities
disallowed this law.26 In 1764 the colony levied a new tax of £100 per

16. Act of Oct. 8, 1698, ch. 197, 1698 S.C. Acts 153.
17. Id.
18. For statistics on the growth of the white and slave populations in colonial South Carolina
see PETER WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670
THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION 131-66 (1974).
19. Act of Dec. 11, 1717, ch. 388, 1714 S.C. Acts 368-70; see also W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870, at
17 (1896), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/webdubois/DuBoisSuppression
Slavetrade6x9.pdf.
20. An Act for Laying an Imposition on Negroes, ch. 395, 3 S.C. Stat. 56-7 (1719).
21. See generally WOOD, supra note 18.
22. An Act for the Better Strengthening of this Province, ch.669, 1740 S.C. Acts 556-57.
23. Id. at 557.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 556.
26. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 18.
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head on imported slaves because, as the legislature noted, the growing
number of African-born slaves “may prove of the most dangerous
consequence.”27 However, as it had done in 1740, the legislature
delayed the start of this duty, this time for just over sixteen months.28
The law was only in force until 1767, but the trade was not resumed
after that, presumably because of the growing tension between the
colonies and Britain.29 This ended the trade there until after the
Revolution, when South Carolina briefly resumed the trade.30
The use of tax policy to limit the slave trade suggests that the South
Carolinians wanted to avoid any moral issues that might have arisen
with a debate over absolutely closing the trade. In addition, by using an
economic tool to regulate an economic activity, the South Carolina
government enlisted the only bureaucracy available—the tax collectors
and regulators of the colony’s ports—to limit the trade. The tax policy
may also have made enforcement easier because juries or judges
sympathetic to slavery might have been unwilling to convict someone on
criminal charges for illegal importation, but enforcement of tax laws
would have been seen as “neutral” on slavery.31
Shortly before the Revolution, Virginia also tried to curtail or ban
the trade, not for prudential reasons but mostly to prevent the outflow of
capital from the colony, although the law also had the benefit of raising
the value of slaves already in the colony.32 In 1769 Virginia raised the
tax on slaves,33 which led to more than seventy petitions from Liverpool
and Lancaster merchants, who argued that the new tax law was to raise
the value of those slaves already in the colony as well as those who
would be born in the future.34 This was a classic case of “self-dealing”
because the Virginia lawmakers were also the largest slave-owners in the

27. Act of August 25, 1764, ch. 933, 1764 S.C. Acts 187-88.
28. Id.
29. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 19.
30. Act of March 28, 1787, ch. 7, 1787 S.C. Acts. 430, reprinted in DuBois, supra note 19, at
229 app. A; Act of Dec. 17, 1803, ch. 7, 1803 S.C. Acts 449, reprinted in DUBOIS, supra note 19, at
240 app. B; DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 19; see generally Jed H. Shugerman, The Louisiana
Purchase and South Carolina’s Reopening of the Slave Trade in 1803, 22 J. OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 263 (2002).
31. There may be a lesson here for modern trafficking issues – that the tax structure and the
pursuit of unpaid taxes on illegal earnings might be a useful way to fight trafficking because it
would avoid many criminal “proof” issues while still getting at the traffickers.
32. Richard K. MacMaster, Arthur Lee’s “Address on Slavery”: An Aspect of Virginia’s
Struggle to End the Slave Trade, 1765-1774, 80 THE VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 141, 14849 (1972).
33. Act of June 1, 1770, ch. 7, 1770 Va. Acts 336.
34. MacMaster, supra note 32, at 148.
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colony.35 The Crown overruled this law, declaring it would not “approve
so high a duty on the importation of a considerable article of British
Commerce.”36
In 1772 Virginia passed yet another law, this time taxing slaves at a
prohibitive level.37 This statute was accompanied by a petition from the
Virginia legislature to the King arguing that “[t]he importation of slaves
into the colonies from the coast of Africa, hath long been considered as a
trade of great inhumanity, and under its present encouragement, we have
too much reason to fear [it] will endanger the very existence of your
majesty’s American dominions.”38 Thus, the Virginia legislators asked
the King to “remove all those restraints on your majesty’s governors of
this colony, which inhibit their assenting to such laws as might check so
very pernicious a commerce.”39
The Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore, in fact signed this bill,
believing it was in his power to do so. He urged the home government
to allow it, arguing in favor of the law, not on economic or humanitarian
grounds, but on public policy and prudential grounds. He noted that the
majority of whites in the colony were
very anxious for an Act to lay an additional duty upon the importation
of Slaves, in order to restrain the introduction of people, the Number of
whom, already in the Colony, gives them Just cause to apprehend the
most dangerous Consequence there from, and therefore makes it
necessary that they should fall upon means, not only of preventing
their increase, but, also of lessening their number, and the interest of
the Country would Manifestly require the total expulsion of them.40

The slave trade was vital to the British economy and the slave
trading interests had powerful patrons in the government. Thus, it is
perhaps not surprising that the Royal Government overruled Governor
35. Id. In many ways these laws and the British response prefigured American commerce
clause jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court strikes down state laws that favor in-state producers
or businesses. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824) (striking down a New York law that
forbade out-of-state competitors from landing passenger ships in New York state); see also,
Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914) (striking down discriminatory freight
rates that favored in-state shippers); see also, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465-66 (2005)
(striking down laws favoring in-state wine producers over out-of-state producers).
36. MacMaster, supra note 32, at 149.
37. Act of Feb. 1777, ch. 22, 1777 Va. Acts 530.
38. The petition is quoted at length in ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES
51-52 (1803).
39. Id.
40. Darold D. Wax, Negro Import Duties in Colonial Virginia: A Study of British Commercial
Policy and Local Public Policy, 79 VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 29, 42 (1971) (quoting
Lord Dunmore speaking to Lord Hillsborough, May 1, 1772).
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Dunmore and voided the statute. 41 In his Summary View of the Rights of
British America (1774), Thomas Jefferson asserted, somewhat
disingenuously, that Virginians favored the “abolition of domestic slavery”
and that as the first step towards this end “it is necessary to exclude all
further importations from Africa.”42 He complained, however, that “our
repeated attempts to effect this . . . by imposing duties which might amount
to a prohibition, have been hitherto defeated by his majesty’s negative.”43
There is, in fact, no evidence that any substantial number of white
Virginians opposed slavery at this time.44 In his first draft of the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson condemned the Crown
in more forceful language, asserting that the King had “waged cruel war
against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and
liberty,” by perpetuating the African slave trade.45 Calling the African
trade “piratical warfare,” Jefferson asserted that “the CHRISTIAN king
of Great Britain” was so “determin[ed] to keep open a market where
MEN” were bought and sold that he used his “negative” to suppress
“every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable
commerce.”46
The Continental Congress removed Jefferson’s tirade from the draft
of the Declaration, in part because it simply did not ring true.47 The
colonists, for the most part, had been willing and eager purchasers of
slaves, as the rapid growth of the slave population showed. Nor is there
any evidence that either Jefferson or any of the other leaders of Virginia
had any interest in actually ending slavery.48 Virginia’s attempt to ban
the trade was mostly economic and prudential, and not based on any
moral opposition to slavery per se. Similarly, the Crown’s refusal to
allow Virginia to limit or end the trade was economic.

41. Earl John Murray Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, A Proclamation for publishing the
ratification of three acts of the Assembly, and the repeal of three other acts (24 June 1773), in 6
EXECUTIVE JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 651-52 (Benjamin J. Hillman ed.,
1966). For a discussion of this source see Wax, supra note 40, at 42-44.
42. Thomas Jefferson, Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THE FOUNDER’S
CONSTITUTION Ch. 14, Doc. 10 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s10.html.
43. Id.
44. See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2001).
45. See Jefferson’s “original Rough draught” of the Declaration of Independence, reprinted in
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 423-27 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950).
46. Jefferson’s “Original Rough draught” of the Declaration of Independence, supra note 45.
47. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 140.
48. Id.
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During the Revolution all of the new states banned or suspended
the trade. In 1774, Virginia’s emerging revolutionary government
banned the trade as part of general non-importation resolutions49 and in
1778 the legislature formally banned the trade.50 Most slaves came on
English ships, and even those on American ships were usually purchased
from agents of the English traders stationed on the west coast of Africa.
Thus, a ban on the trade was part of the general non-importation
movement at the beginning of the Revolution.
In some of the northern colonies abolition of the trade had a moral
as well as an economic basis.51 Opposition to slavery was growing, and
during or immediately after the Revolution, five states would either end
slavery outright (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) or pass gradual
abolition acts (Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) that would
lead to a relatively speedy end to slavery.52 In those states, a ban on the
trade was consistent with growing opposition to slavery itself.
In the remaining new states, where slavery was central to the
economy, opposition to the trade was economic and political, but not
essentially moral. After the Revolution, South Carolina reopened the
trade, but then suspended it in 1787 because of an on-going depression
in the state.53 Similarly, North Carolina levied a prohibitive tax on
imported slaves and then in 1794 banned the trade altogether.54 The
trade remained open in Georgia in 1787, but in the wake of the Haitian
Revolution, that state would also ban the trade.55 Thus, in 1787, when
the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, only Georgia and
North Carolina allowed the importation of slaves.

49. MacMaster, supra note 32, at 152.
50. Act of Oct. 5, 1778, ch. 1, 1778 Va. Acts 471.
51. ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH
117, 201-08 (1967); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
262-64 (1972); DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 17651820, at 295, 299 (1967); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1765-1848, at 42-51 (1978); see generally PAUL
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY: FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981).
52. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 51, at 201-08; DAVIS, supra note 51; ROBINSON, supra note 51;
WIECEK, supra note 51; FINKELMAN, supra note 51.
53. Act of March 28, 1787, ch. 7, 1787 S.C. Acts. 430; Shugerman, supra note 30.
54. An Act Against West Indian Slaves, ch. 1, 1795 N.C. Sess. Laws 786, reprinted in
DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 237 app. B.
55. Act of Dec. 19, 1793, 1793 Ga. Laws 442, in MARBURY & CRAWFORD, DIGEST 442,
reprinted in DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 236 app. B.
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The Revolution brought freedom to slaves who joined the armies
on both sides or escaped in the chaos of war.56 Thousands of slaves left
South Carolina and Georgia when the British Army evacuated those
states.57 Some of these people remained free, while others ended up as
slaves in the British Caribbean.58 At the end of the war, leaders in the
Deep South fully expected to reopen the trade at some point to replenish
their slaves, and thus at the Constitutional Convention they fought for
continuing the slave trade.
In 1787, when the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia,
there were virtually no slaves being imported into the nation, as only
Georgia and North Carolina technically still allowed the African trade.
But with the expectation of reopening the trade in the near future, the
delegates from the Carolinas and Georgia jealously guarded their right to
import slaves.59 Thus, Charles Pinckney told the Convention that South
Carolina would “never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade.”60
His older cousin, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, explained why
this was so, declaring “S[outh] Carolina and Georgia cannot do without
slaves.”61
III. THE SLAVE TRADE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
A major reason for calling the Philadelphia Convention was to give
the new national government the power to regulate international and
domestic commerce.62 All of the delegates understood that the national
government had to have some power over international and domestic
commerce, but the delegates disagreed on the scope of that power.63
Most northern delegates favored a strong national commerce power that
would stimulate foreign trade, help defend domestic commercial markets
from foreign competition, and help protect the northern maritime

56. BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 51-67 (1961);
GRAHAM HODGES, THE BLACK LOYALIST DIRECTORY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN EXILE IN THE AGE
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION xi-xxi (1996).
57. HODGES, supra note 56; SYLVIA FREY, WATER FROM THE ROCK: BLACK RESISTANCE IN A
REVOLUTIONARY AGE 81-85, 108-109 (1991).
58. HODGES, supra note 56; JOHN W. PULIS, MOVING ON: BLACK LOYALISTS IN THE AFROATLANTIC WORLD xv (1999).
59. ROBINSON, supra note 51, at 295-99.
60. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 364 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
61. Id. at 371; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 28.
62. MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (2002); see also FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 10.
63. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 22-32.
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industry.64 Southern delegates feared that this power would be used to
adversely affect their states, which produced raw materials for export,
were dependent on imports, and had no local shipping industry.65
Slavery was at the heart of these southern fears because the South’s
economy was based on agricultural products produced by slaves.
Southern delegates at the convention envisioned an aggressive
commercial North that would undermine their economy though export
taxes and other commercial regulations. While there was no significant
antislavery movement in the North at this time, Southern delegates
feared the North would soon turn on their institution, using tax and
commerce powers to attack slavery. No northerners at the convention
even suggested that the national government should be able to regulate
slavery or touch slavery in the states. But some southerners feared this
would happen in a stronger national government. Thus, in one debate,
South Carolina’s Pierce Butler blurted out: “[t]he security the South[ern]
States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which
some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to
do.”66
In addition to fearing that taxation or commercial regulation might
indirectly harm slavery, delegates from the Carolinas and Georgia also
feared that if the new Congress could regulate commerce it would
immediately ban the African slave trade. No northerner ever raised this
issue. But, at the Convention, the delegates from South Carolina raised
it on their own, when the Convention debated the powers of Congress
over what the delegates called “navigation acts,” and what is today
known as the commerce power.67 Their fear was quite simple: if
Congress had plenary power to regulate international commerce, they
assumed that a majority of Congress would immediately vote to close
the African slave trade.68
In the wake of the Revolution, opposition to the trade was strong
for a variety of reasons. Some Americans found slavery deeply immoral
and a fundamental violation of the principles of the Revolution.69 By the
time of the Convention, Pennsylvania and all the New England states
had either ended slavery outright or were in the process of ending

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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slavery through gradual abolition acts.70 Southerners presumed these
states would also oppose a continuation of the trade. In addition, the
South Carolinians feared that other slave states, like New York, New
Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, would support a ban on the trade.71
These fears were not unreasonable, because many Americans made a
distinction between slavery and the trade.72
Some Americans who were comfortable with, or at least resigned
to, the continuation of slavery, nevertheless believed that the African
trade was particularly immoral and pernicious.73 Many people who
could justify—or at least rationalize—holding people in bondage, who
were born to that condition, saw no good reason for bringing more
slaves to the nation. Other Americans, particularly southerners, who had
no strong moral feelings about the trade, or even slavery, nevertheless
believed that slavery was an inherent threat to the society, and
continuing to import African slaves would only exacerbate an already
dangerous situation. Having just fought a revolution for their own
liberty, many Americans worried that slaves might soon follow the
model of their masters. Finally, many slave owners in Virginia and
Maryland opposed the African trade for narrowly economic reasons:
they had more slaves than they needed, and knew that if the trade ended
their surplus slaves would become more valuable.74
At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates from South
Carolina, supported by other Southerners, insisted on explicit protection
for the African trade in the Constitution.75 The debates over this issue
were among the most intense in the Convention. While these debates
were not part of the debate over slave representation that led to the
Three-Fifths Clause, they were influenced by that clause.76 Once the
Convention agreed to count slaves for purposes of representation in
Congress, the status of the trade became more important. A continuation
70. FINKELMAN, supra note 51, at 41-45; ZILVERSMIT, supra note 51.
71. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 17, 32.
72. See id. at 31-32.
73. Id. at 23-24; see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60,
at 370 (reproducing speech by George Mason attacking the slave trade); see also Peter Wallenstein,
Flawed Keepers of the Flame: The Interpreters of George Mason, 102 VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND
BIOGRAPHY 229-60 (1994); see also DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 39-40.
74. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 371. For
example, in the 1780s and 1790s Thomas Jefferson sold more than 80 slaves to raise money to pay
his debts and buy the many things he imported from France. See FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at ch.
6-7.
75. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 210, 364-65,
370, 373.
76. Id. at 106, 215-25, 369-75.
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of the trade would not only lead to an increase of slaves and human
misery in the new nation, but it would also strengthen the South in
Congress, giving more political power to the supporters of bondage.
This prospect led Gouverneur Morris, who represented Pennsylvania at
the Convention, to denounce the immorality of political compromises
over slavery:
The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained
comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the
Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity
tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections &
dam(n)s them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a
Govt. instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the
Citizen of Pa or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so
nefarious a practice.77

Despite the attempts of Morris and a few others to raise the moral
question of slavery, most of the delegates focused on compromise and
economic necessity.78 In August, the Convention debated the Commerce
Clause, which would give Congress the power to regulate international
and interstate commerce by a simple majority.79 Before that debate
could take place, the South Carolina delegation insisted on protection for
the African slave trade and a ban on export taxes.80 Southerners
believed that export taxes could be used to tax the commodities
produced by slave labor, such as tobacco and rice, and thus indirectly
harm slavery.81 South Carolina’s John Rutledge noted that he would
vote for the Commerce Clause as it stood, but only “on [the] condition
that the subsequent part relating to negroes should also be agreed to.”82
Delegates from Connecticut and Massachusetts indicated some support
for Rutledge’s position. What should be called the “dirty compromise”
of the Convention was taking shape.83 The South Carolina delegation
would support the Commerce Clause if New England would support a

77. Id. at 222.
78. Id. at 210-13, 221, 253-54, 334, 355-56; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 66, at 637, 640.
79. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 305, 356.
80. Id. at 305-06.
81. Id. at 360.
82. Id. at 306; see also Paul Finkelman, Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death
and How It Was Made, Part 2, 32 PROLOGUE (Winter 2000) available at
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-2.html;
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 25.
83. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 25.
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prohibition on export taxes and a protection for the slave trade.84 This
understanding solidified in late August.
On August 21, the New England states joined the five slave states
south of Delaware on three crucial votes.85 On the first vote, all three
New England states voted to defeat an amendment to the draft
Constitution that would have allowed Congress, by a simple majority
vote, to tax exports in order to raise money to support the national
government.86 During the debate over this motion Connecticut’s Oliver
Ellsworth—a future Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court—
argued against taxing exports because such taxes would unfairly hurt the
South which produced major export crops such as “[t]obo. rice and
indigo.”87 Ellsworth believed “a tax on these alone would be partial and
unjust.”88 Next, in a key five-to-six vote, Connecticut joined the five
slave states to defeat a proposal, made by James Madison, to allow taxes
on exports by a two-thirds vote of Congress.89 On the final vote, to
absolutely ban all export taxes, Massachusetts joined Connecticut and
the southern states in voting to prohibit export taxes, passing the
measure seven-to-four.90 During the debate, the Virginia delegation was
divided, three-to-two, with James Madison and George Washington
unsuccessfully favoring Congressional power to tax exports.91
The Convention then debated a motion by Luther Martin to allow a
tax on imported slaves.92 Martin represented Maryland, a slave state, but
one with a surplus of slaves, a fact that helps explain his opposition to
the African trade. Rutledge opposed Martin’s motion with a twopronged attack. He first told the Convention that the “true question at
present is whether the Southn. States shall or shall not be parties to the
Union.”93 The implied threat of secession was clear. He then told the
northern delegates that, if they would “consult their interest,” they would
“not oppose the increase of Slaves which will increase the commodities
of which they will become the carriers.”94 Ellsworth of Connecticut
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 360.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 363.
90. Id. at 363-64.
91. Id.; Finkelman, supra note 82 (citing STAUGHTON LYND, The Abolitionist Critique of the
Constitution, in CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: TEN ESSAYS
159-60 (1967)); FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 26.
92. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 364.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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agreed, refusing to debate the “morality or wisdom of slavery,” instead
simply asserting, “[w]hat enriches a part enriches the whole.”95 The
alliance for profit between the Deep South and New England was now
fully developed.96 It is important to understand that this was not an
alliance stimulated by New England’s involvement in the African slave
trade itself. By 1787, all of the New England states had banned the trade
and prohibited their citizens from participating in it.97 The alliance was
over trade and commerce that would involve the products of slave labor,
and not the bodies of slaves themselves.
Despite the support from Connecticut, Charles Pinckney reaffirmed
that South Carolina would “never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave
trade.”98 In a rhetorical slight-of-hand that none of the other delegates
challenged, Pinckney equated taxing the African trade with a prohibition
on the trade itself. This was part of the South Carolinians’ apparent
tactic of constantly exaggerating any threat to slavery combined with
persistent blustering threats to oppose the Constitution if they did not get
their way on slavery-related issues.
The next day Roger Sherman, also of Connecticut, declared his
personal disapproval of slavery but refused to condemn it in other parts
of the nation. He opposed any prohibition of the trade, asserting that
“the public good did not require” an end to the trade.99 This was an odd
argument to make, since no one at the Convention had ever suggested
the Constitution ought to prohibit the trade. In this debate, Sherman
apparently accepted the hyperbole of the South Carolina delegation that
even a tax on the trade was the equivalent to an outright ban. Sherman
also implicitly accepted the arguments coming from the Deep South that
anything short of an explicit protection of the trade was the same thing
as ban. Sherman noted that the states currently had the right to import
slaves, and he opposed tampering with this right because “it was
expedient to have as few objections as possible” to the new
Constitution.100 Here Sherman assumed it was necessary to defuse
southern opposition to the Constitution, which might result from a ban
on the slave trade, but he did not think it necessary to placate those in the
North–even in his own state–who might oppose the Constitution if it
allowed the slave trade to continue. Indeed, Sherman was prepared to

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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appease those who supported the slave trade, but he apparently was
unconcerned about the strong opposition to the slave trade in his own
region.
Next, Sherman observed that “the abolition of slavery seemed to be
going on in the U.S.”101 He argued that if the Convention and the
national government did nothing about the slave trade, the “good sense
of the several States” would soon put an end to all slavery in the
country.102 In making this argument, Sherman either confused the
abolition of the slave trade with the abolition of slavery itself, or he
foolishly believed that because New England and Pennsylvania had
begun to abolish slavery, the rest of the nation would soon follow.103
Finally, revealing his priorities, Sherman urged the delegates to hurry
and finish their business noting, no doubt, that they had been in session
for almost three months.104
George Mason of Virginia responded to Sherman with a fierce
attack on the “infernal traffic” in slaves, which he blamed on “the
avarice of British Merchants.”105 Reflecting the sectional hostilities at
the Convention, as well as trying to lay blame on anyone but Virginians
for the existence of slavery, Mason then “lamented” that his “[e]astern
brethren had from a lust of gain embarked in this nefarious traffic.”106
Mason leveled some of the strongest criticism of slavery yet heard at the
Convention, declaring it an “evil” system which produced “the most
pernicious effect on manners.”107 He declared that “every master of
slaves is born a petty tyrant” and warned that slavery would “bring the
judgment of heaven on a Country” and ultimately produce “national
calamities.”108 Despite this apparent attack on the whole institution,
Mason ended his speech by demanding only that the national
government “have power to prevent the increase of slavery” by
prohibiting the African trade.109 As historian Peter Wallenstein has
argued, “[w]hatever his occasional rhetoric, George Mason was—if one
must choose—proslavery, not antislavery. He acted on behalf of

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 370.
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 26-27.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 370; see also
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 27.
105. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 370.
106. Id. at 370; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 27.
107. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 370; see also
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 27.
108. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 370.
109. Id.
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Virginia slaveholders, not Virginia slaves,” when he opposed a
continuation of the African trade.110
Others at the Convention understood this quite well. Mason failed
to say that Virginia, like Maryland, had a surplus of slaves and did not
need the African slave trade any longer. But James McHenry candidly
wrote in his private notes: “[t]hat the population or increase of slaves in
Virginia exceeded their calls for their services,” and thus a prohibition of
the slave trade “would be a monopoly” in Virginia’s “favor.”111 Under
such conditions “Virginia etc would make their own terms for such
[slaves] as they might sell.”112 The “etc” no doubt included McHenry’s
own state of Maryland.113
Ellsworth of Connecticut, adopting the same pose as Sherman,
answered Mason. Because “he had never owned a slave,” Ellsworth
declared he “could not judge of the effects of slavery on character.”114
But if slavery were as wrong as Mason had suggested, then logically,
merely ending the trade was insufficient. But of course Ellsworth knew
that the Virginians like Mason were not suggesting that the national
government abolish slavery.115 Therefore, since there were many slaves
in Virginia and Maryland and fewer in the Deep South, Ellsworth argued
that any prohibition on the trade would be “be unjust towards S.
Carolina & Georgia.”116 So Ellsworth urged the Convention not to
“intermeddle” in the affairs of other states.117
The Convention had now witnessed the bizarre phenomenon of a
New Englander defending the slave trade against the attacks of a
Virginian. Once again, it is important to understand that in this debate,
no one ever suggested that the Constitution interfere with slavery in the
states or that it ban the trade. The South Carolinians had successfully
altered the debate to one over a ban on the slave trade, which ignored the
fact that no one had suggested such a ban. In doing this, they were able
to get New Englanders to defend their right to import slaves, thus setting
the stage for an affirmative protection for the trade.
The Carolinians were of course quite capable of defending their
own institution. Charles Pinckney, citing ancient Rome and Greece,
110.
111.
notes).
112.
113.
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115.
116.
117.
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declared that slavery was “justified by the example of all the world.”118
He warned that any prohibition of the slave trade would “produce
serious objections to the Constitution which he wished to see
adopted.”119 His older and more famous cousin, General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, also declared his support for the Constitution, but
noted that his “personal influence . . . would be of no avail towards
obtaining the assent” of his home state.120 He believed Virginia’s
opposition to the trade was more pecuniary than moral. Virginia would
“gain by stopping the importations” because “her slaves will rise in
value, and she has more than she wants.”121 Prohibiting the trade would
force South Carolina and Georgia “to confederate” on “unequal
terms.”122 While Virginia might gain from the closing of the slave trade,
Pinckney implied that the nation as a whole would not benefit from
closing the trade. Pinckney argued that more slaves would produce
more goods, and that result would help not only the South but also the
North, where the states involved in “the carrying trade.”123 Furthermore,
he declared, “[t]he more consumption also, and the more of this, the
more of revenue for the common treasury.”124 Pinckney saw the slave
trade solely as an economic issue, and therefore, thought it “reasonable”
that imported slaves be taxed.125 But a prohibition of the slave trade
would be “an exclusion of S. Carolina from the Union.”126 As he had
made clear at the beginning of his speech, “S. Carolina and Georgia
cannot do without slaves.”127 Rutledge and Butler added similar
sentiments, as did Abraham Baldwin of Georgia and Williamson of
North Carolina.128
New England twangs now supported the Southern drawls. Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts offered some conciliatory remarks, and
Sherman, ever the ally of the South, declared that “it was better to let the
[Southern] States import slaves than to part with them, if they made that
a sine qua non.”129 But in what may have been an attempt to give his

118.
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122.
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124.
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remarks an antislavery tone, he argued that taxing imported slaves was
morally wrong, because that “implied they were property.”130 This
position undoubtedly pleased Sherman’s southern allies, who did not
want to pay taxes on any slaves they imported. Sherman’s speech also
underscored the profound support that the Carolinians and Georgians
found among some New Englanders.131
Similarly, Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that “the subject
should be considered in a political light only,”132 implying that the moral
questions should be ignored. He disagreed with Sherman on the taxation
issue, however, arguing that an “exemption of slaves from duty whilst
every other import was subjected to it, was an inequality that could not
fail to strike the commercial sagacity of the Northn. & middle States.”133
These arguments illustrate the reasons for cooperation between
New England and the Deep South on this issue. New Englanders,
involved in the “carrying trade,” would profit from transporting rice and
other products produced by slave labor.134 And the South Carolinians
seemed willing to support the New Englanders’ demands for
Congressional power to regulate all commerce. In return, New
Englanders would support the right of the Carolinas and Georgia to
import the slaves they could not “do without.”135
On the other side of the issue, John Dickinson of Delaware
vigorously opposed allowing the slave trade to continue. Dickinson
argued that the trade was “inadmissible on every principle of honor and
safety.”136 Furthermore, he was prepared to call the Carolinians’ bluff
on the question of whether they would actually join the stronger Union
under the new Constitution. Dickinson declared he “could not believe
that the Southn. States would refuse to confederate”137 over this issue,
especially because Dickinson did not believe that the power to end trade
would be “immediately exercised by the Genl. Government.”138 James
Wilson was also skeptical of southern threats, asserting that South

130. Id.
131. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 28.
132. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 373.
133. Id.
134. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 28. It is important to understand that there was not an
expectation that New England ships would be transporting slaves from Africa to South Carolina,
because all of the New England states had prohibited their citizens from participating in the African
trade.
135. Id.
136. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 372.
137. Id. at 372-73.
138. Id. at 373.
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Carolina and Georgia would “never refuse to Unite because the
importation might be prohibited,” since he expected these states would
end the trade on their own.139
The most surprising contribution to this debate came from
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, who had previously been the most
consistent opponent of slavery at the Convention.140 He suggested that
the subject of commercial regulation acts and the slave trade be sent to
committee, because “[t]hese things may form a bargain among the
Northern and Southern States.”141 The Convention quickly accepted his
suggestion.142
On August 25, the Convention considered a proposal that Congress
be barred from prohibiting the African slave trade until 1800, but that in
the meantime a reasonable tax could be levied on imported slaves. 143
South Carolina’s General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney immediately
urged that the date be changed to 1808, which would be twenty years
after the Constitution was ratified.144
Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts seconded this motion.145 James Madison, who owned
slaves but abhorred the slave trade, complained that this provision was
“dishonorable to the National character” and to the Constitution and that
“twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended
from the liberty to import slaves.”146 Nevertheless, the delegates
accepted Pinckney’s change by a seven-to-four vote.147 Three New
England states, Maryland, and the three Deep South states supported
Pinckney’s motion.148
Gouverneur Morris, still resisting a continuation of the slave trade,
then proposed that the clause specifically declare that the “importation of
slaves” be limited to the Carolinas and Georgia.149 Morris wanted it

139. Id. at 372.
140. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29.
141. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 374.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 414; see FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29-30. The Committee reported the
compromise proposal on the 24th, and the convention began to debate it on the 25th. 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 400, 414.
144. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415;
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29.
145. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415.
146. Id. On Madison, see generally RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY
(1990).
147. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415.
148. Id.; FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29
149. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415;
FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 29.
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known “that this part of the Constitution was a compliance with those
States.”150 Having made this motion only to embarrass supporters of the
trade, Morris withdrew it.151 By a seven-to-four vote the Convention
then adopted the slave trade provision.152 The three New England states
once again joined Maryland and the Deep South to allow the slave trade
to continue for twenty years.153 This vote formed a key component of
the “dirty compromise.”154
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE SLAVE TRADE CLAUSE
The final slave trade clause read:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the State now
existing shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.155

The clause did not mention slaves or the trade, but everyone at the
Convention knew that was what it was about. The wording of the clause
was clearly designed to obfuscate what the Convention had done, and
the Connecticut delegation was instrumental in this result.156 This,
however, did not fool anyone. Thus, an anonymous author in
Connecticut asked: “why this sentence should be couched in this blind
mysterious form of words, unless to avoid using the word Negroes, I
must leave to those that drew it to explain.”157 He concluded that “the
seeming case taken to cover the true intent of this” clause was a
sufficient reason to oppose the entire Constitution.158 Similarly, in
campaigning against the Constitution, the Connecticut politician

150. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415.
151. Id. at 416.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 44, at 29.
155. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
156. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 415; Paul
Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413,
425-26 (2001).
157. Letter from Massachusetts, CONNECTICUT JOURNAL, Oct. 24, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 378-79 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION].
158. Id.
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Benjamin Gale attacked the “artful language they use to cover their
meaning” in the slave trade provision.159 He asked:
Why all this sly cunning and artful mode of expression unless to cover
from your observation and notice that Negroes was intended by the
word persons . . . lest it should frighten people who may have some
tender feelings and a just sense of the rights of human nature.160

It is important to understand that the clause did not require an end
to the trade in 1808. It only prevented Congress from ending the trade
before 1808. Moreover, when the Convention accepted this clause
almost all the delegates assumed that the Deep South and the Southwest
would grow faster than the rest of the nation.161 The delegates assumed
that what is now Alabama and Mississippi would become new states,
and that South Carolina and especially Georgia would have much larger
populations.162 If these assumptions had been correct, then by 1808 the
states that most wanted to continue the trade would have had enough
political power, and enough allies, to prevent an end to the trade.
Ending the trade would require that a bill pass both houses of Congress
and be signed by the president. That process would give the supporters
of the trade three opportunities to stop a bill, and keep the trade open.
Thus, the slave trade debate was seen in the Deep South as a major
victory. South Carolina and Georgia had bought two decades to gain the
strength to preserve the trade forever.
V. THE SLAVE TRADE AND RATIFICATION
The slave trade provision was a significant factor in the debates
over ratification, but its impact was complicated. Opponents of the
Constitution, in both the North and the South, roundly condemned the
clause. On the other hand, supporters of the Constitution—even those
who were ambivalent or hostile to slavery—praised the clause, although
for very different reasons.

159. Benjamin Gale, Address at the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 12, 1787), in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 424.
160. Id. at 425.
161. FINKELMAN, supra note 44. See, e.g., Benjamin Gale, Address at the constitutional
convention (Nov. 12, 1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at
423, 429 n.7 (predicting the South would dominate Congress in the future).
162. This was made clear in the discussion over the allocation of members of Congress before
there was a census. See FINKELMAN, supra note 44.
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A. Anti-Federalists and the Slave Trade Provision
Anti-federalists in the North and the Upper South hammered home,
again and again, the fundamental immorality of the clause. On the last
day of the Convention, Virginia’s George Mason, to no one’s surprise,
declared he would not sign the Constitution, citing the slave trade
provisions as one of his major objections.163 A man who owned many
slaves, and who would never emancipate any of them,164 Mason
nevertheless saw no reason to add more slaves to the nation, because
“such importations render the United States weaker, more vulnerable,
and less capable of defense.”165 He did not add, but could have if he had
been totally honest, that the slave trade would also diminish the value of
the many slaves he already owned. Like other elite Virginians—George
Washington being a major exception—Mason sold men “as you would
do cattle at a market,” 166 to pay his debts and support his lifestyle.
Many in the North, and some in the South, took a more principled
stand against the Constitution because of the slave trade provision. A
New Yorker complained that the Constitution condoned “drenching the
bowels of Africa in gore, for the sake of enslaving its free-born innocent
inhabitants.”167 A correspondent in the Philadelphia Independent
Gazetteer sarcastically noted that “[a]mong the blessings of the newproposed government” were the lack of a free press, the lack of a jury
trial in civil cases, and “[a] Free importation of negroes for one and
twenty years.”168 A Virginian thought the slave trade provision was an
“excellent clause” for “an Algerian constitution: but not so well calculated (I hope) for the latitude of America.”169

163. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 637-40.
164. Wallenstein, supra note 73; John Michael Vlach, Material Culture in the United States, in
MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY, supra note 3, at 566.
165. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 640.
166. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Spotswood (Nov. 23, 1794), in THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 47
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-44) (explaining that he would sell slaves, like cattle). On Washington
and slaveholding see HENRY WIENCEK, AN IMPERFECT GOD: GEORGE WASHINGTON, HIS SLAVES
AND THE CREATION OF AMERICA 183-88 (2003); see also, FRITZ HIRSHFELD, GEORGE WASHINGTON
AND SLAVERY: A DOCUMENTARY PORTRAYAL 16-17 (1997); JOHN C. MILLER, WOLF BY THE EARS:
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY 107 (1977).
167. Letters from a Countryman from Dutchess County (Jan. 22, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 62 (Herbert F. Storing ed., 1981).
168. Blessings of the New Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 6, 1787, in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 354-56.
169. Essay by Republicus (Mar. 12, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
167, at 169.
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A Connecticut anti-federalist made a more practical allusion to the
problem of the African slave trade and the Algerian slavery. At the
time, New England sailors worried about being captured along the
Barbary Coast and sold into slavery in North Africa. He argued that the
United States would
have no right to complain of the Algerines, who live on the coast of
Africa, if they enslave the Americans whom they find sailing in those
seas, if we will send our vessels across the Atlantic, of set design, to
purchase, kidnap, and decoy the inhabitants of the more southern states
of the globe. 170

It was more than just the slave trade that northern anti-federalists
feared. Three opponents of the Constitution in Massachusetts noted that
the Constitution bound the states together as a “whole” and “the states”
were “under obligation . . . reciprocally to aid each other in defense and
support of every thing to which they are entitled thereby, right or
wrong.”171 Thus, they might be called to suppress a slave revolt or in
some other way defend the institution. They could not predict how
slavery might entangle them in the future, but they did know that “this
lust for slavery, [was] portentous of much evil in America, for the cry of
innocent blood, . . . hath undoubtedly reached to the Heavens, to which
that cry is always directed, and will draw down upon them vengeance
adequate to the enormity of the crime.”172
B Federalists and the Slave Trade Provision
Northern supporters of the Constitution were at a rhetorical
disadvantage in this debate, but they nevertheless had to engage the
issue. They developed three tactics. The most honest response to the
slave trade clause was to acknowledge that the Constitution protected the
trade because it was necessary to secure the support of the Deep South,
but that this clause was still an improvement over the current situation
because under the Articles of Confederation, the national government
had no power to regulate commerce.
These supporters of the Constitution argued that under the new
system of government it would be possible, in just twenty years, to end

170. Letter from Massachusetts, supra note 157, at 378-79.
171. See Arms, Milichi Maynard, and Samuel Field, Reasons for Dissent, in 4 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 263 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) supra note 167, at 263.
172. Id.
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the trade.173 For example, Tench Coxe, a Philadelphia businessman who
was also active in the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, argued that the
clause was a “clear implication” that the trade was “inconsistent with the
disposition and the duties of the people of America,” and that the
“temporary reservation of any particular matter must ever be deemed as
admission that it should be done away.”174 Coxe admitted that this
clause was in the Constitution because in the Convention “regard was
necessarily paid to the peculiar situation of our southern fellowcitizens.”175 Similarly, an anonymous writer in New Jersey said that
“the prospect of putting a stop to the abominable and accursed traffic,
even at the period of twenty years, fills me with inexpressible joy.”176
The wait was necessary because of the “critical situation of our Southern
brethren,”177 but in the meantime this author noted the states were free to
end the trade according to their own “discretion and humanity.”178
Such arguments were entirely correct and doubtlessly provided
cover for those who favored the Constitution but did not like the slave
trade. It is hard to imagine that they persuaded very many people not
already inclined to support the Constitution, because the arguments did
not answer the question of why the Convention so willingly suspended
its power to regulate commerce only for the African slave trade.
Northern opponents of the Constitution doubtless were underwhelmed
by the argument that their interests had to be sacrificed to placate the
“peculiar situation” of Southerners.
A second argument was that the clause would require an end to the
trade in twenty years, and thus this clause was actually antislavery. Just
after the Convention ended, the Pennsylvania Gazette made this claim,
arguing that the Constitution “provides an effectual check to the African
trade, in the course of one and twenty years.”179 Rather than bemoaning
the law’s waiting period, the Gazette bragged that this clause was
“honorable to America,” and made it “the first Christian power that has
borne a testimony against a practice, that is alike disgraceful to religion,

173. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 598 (1891).
174. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government, PA. GAZETTE, Oct.
24, 1787, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 431.
175. Id.
176. Reply to George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution, N.J. JOURNAL, Dec. 26 1787,
reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 160.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. PA. GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 253-54.
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and repugnant to the true interests and happiness of Society.”180
Similarly, Benjamin Rush assured a private correspondent that in 1808
“there will be an end of the African trade in America.”181
This argument was of course, not correct. The clause clearly did
not require, or even guarantee, an end to the trade. South Carolina’s
delegation was counting on having enough political clout, in 1808, to
prevent an end to the trade. Optimistic supporters of the Constitution
who opposed the trade hoped—correctly as it turned out—that in twenty
years their side would have the votes to end the trade. But, people like
Rush were either themselves misled, or willing to mislead others, in
asserting that the clause guaranteed an end to the trade in 1808.
Ironically, the federalists who supported this interpretation of the
clause may have been the first Americans to implement “popular
constitutionalism” in the interpretation of the Constitution. They helped
turn their wishful thinking into a self-fulfilling prophecy by constantly
asserting that the clause meant the trade would end in 1808. By the time
the Constitution was ratified, many voters—perhaps a majority of
them—believed that the Constitution mandated an end to the trade, when
it did not.
There were, however, limits to how far popular constitutionalism
might reshape the document. The third variation of the northern
federalists’ argument on the trade bears such limitations. This was a
thoroughly misleading, if not outright dishonest, claim that the slave
trade clause would actually lead to an end to slavery itself. However
dishonest the argument was, it may have been politically shrewd. Thus,
James Wilson of Pennsylvania asserted at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention: “I consider this as laying the foundation for banishing
slavery out of this country; and though the period is more distant than I
could wish, yet it will produce the same kind, gradual change, which
was pursued in Pennsylvania.”182 He also predicted that under the
Constitution no new slave states would be admitted to the Union.183 A
day later he declared that this clause was a “lovely feature in the
Constitution” that “would diffuse a beauty over its whole
countenance.”184 In these speeches, Wilson made the subtle shift from

180. Id.
181. Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Coakley Lettsom (Sept. 28, 1787), reprinted in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 157, at 262.
182. James Wilson, Remarks at the Penn. Convention (Dec. 3 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 463 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 499.
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the “trade” to slavery, and since most of his listeners were not as legally
sophisticated as Wilson, he was able to fudge the issue. Thus, Wilson
told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that after “the lapse of a few
years . . . Congress will have power to exterminate slavery from within
our borders.”185
Since Wilson attended all the debates in the Convention over this
clause, it is impossible to accept this statement as his understanding of
the slave trade clause. More likely, he simply made this argument to
win support for the Constitution. Supporters in other states made similar
claims. For example, in Massachusetts, Rev. Isaac Backus said with “a
door open” to abolish the slave trade “we cannot say that slavery is
struck with apoplexy, yet we may hope it will die with a
consumption.”186 We cannot know if Backus honestly believed this was
true, whether it was merely wishful thinking on his part, or whether he
was intentionally trying to mislead voters. But clearly the Constitution
did not empower the national government to end slavery, even after
1808.
Upper South supporters of the Constitution, like Edmund
Randolph, also made the argument that a ban on the trade was
impossible under the Articles, and thus the Constitution, even if
imperfect, was still a good bargain.187 Deep South supporters of the
Constitution, like Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, simply bragged that
they had won a great victory—as indeed they had—in protecting the
trade for at least twenty years. In summing up the entire Constitution,
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been one of the ablest
defenders of slavery at the Convention, proudly told the South Carolina
House of Representatives: “In short, considering all circumstances, we
have made the best terms for the security of this species of property it
was in our power to make. We would have made better if we could; but
on the whole, I do not think them bad.”188 David Ramsey, writing as
Civis, reminded South Carolinians that a coalition of northern and upper
south members of Congress could end the trade after 1808, but “it is
probable that they will not” because “[t]he more rice we make, the more

185. Id.
186. Isaac Backus, Remarks at Mass. Convention (Feb. 1788), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1422 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
2000).
187. ELLIOT, supra note 173, at 598-99.
188. ELLIOT, supra note 173, at 286.
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business will be for their shipping: their interest will coincide with
ours.”189
VI. REGULATING THE TRADE
While Congress did not have the power to end the trade before
1808, it did have the power to regulate the trade, and starting in 1794
Congress did just that.190 In March, Congress prohibited the use of any
U.S. port or shipyard for the purpose of fitting out or building any ship
to be used in the trade.191 The law also prohibited ships sailing from
U.S. ports from trafficking in slaves to foreign countries.192 Ships
sailing from the United States to Africa, even if of foreign registry, were
required to
give bond with sufficient sureties, to the treasurer of the United States,
that none of the natives of Africa, or any other foreign country or
place, shall be taken on board . . . to be transported, or sold as slaves in
any other foreign place, within nine months thereafter.193

Penalties under the law included fines ranging from $2,000 for
outfitting a ship to $200 for an individual working on such a ship.194
The act provided that the actual ships involved in the trade could be
confiscated.195 The law gave half of all fines to any informants, thus
providing an incentive for ship captains and mariners to monitor the
activities of anyone they suspected of being involved in the illegal
trade.196
In 1800, Congress amended the 1794 act by dramatically increasing
fines for illegal American participation in the trade and giving
informants a right to the entire value of any ship condemned under the
law.197 In addition to not allowing American ships to participate in the
trade, the new law prohibited any American from having any interest in
a ship involved in the trade.198 Thus, Americans could no longer invest

189. David Ramsey, “To the Citizens of South Carolina”, Charleston Columbian Herald, Feb.
4, 1788, in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 25 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986).
190. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 349.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70 (1800).
198. Id.
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in the trade, even if carried on legally by non-U.S. ships.199 If convicted
of having an interest in the trade, an American was subject to a fine that
was double the value of his investment in the vessel and double the
value of any slaves in which he had an interest.200 The 1800 amendment
explicitly prohibited any American citizen or resident alien from
voluntarily serving “on board any foreign ship or vessel . . . employed
in the slave trade.”201 It no longer mattered if the ship was of U.S.
register, or even if the ship left an American port.202 American sailors
found on slavers (ships that transported slaves) were now subject to a
$2,000 fine.203 The law authorized all “commissioned vessels of the
United States, to seize and take any vessel employed” in the trade
contrary to the law, with the crew receiving half the value of the ship
when it was sold.204 This provided an enormous incentive for American
ships to police the trade.
In 1803, South Carolina reopened the trade.205 Earlier that year,
probably in anticipation of South Carolina’s act, Congress passed a new
law regulating the trade.206 This act created new fines for people who
brought slaves into states that banned the importation of slaves.207 The
law applied to any “negro, mulatto, or other person of color” imported
from Africa or the Caribbean.208 The language was apparently used to
prevent people from claiming that illegally imported Africans found on
their ships were not slaves but servants or indentured servants.209
The acts of 1794, 1800, and 1803 had been designed to limit
American participation in the trade, but could not be used to stop the
trade itself, because of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.
Significantly, all of the laws passed before 1807 focused on ships,
sailors, and investors.210 None of the laws had contained any provision
regarding what should happen to slaves illegally imported into the

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Act of Dec 17, 1803, ch. 7, 1803 S.C. Acts 449; see also Shugerman, supra note 30, at
264-66.
206. Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794); Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70
(1800); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (1803).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 4

9-FINKELMAN.DOC

460

4/10/2009 9:03 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:431

United States.211 Indeed, while the 1794 law provided for the sale of a
ship and its “tackle, furniture, apparel and other appurtenances”212 of a
slaver, it did not mention what should happen to any slaves or other
cargo on the ship.213 Presumably, they too would be sold for the benefit
of the United States, the informant, or any other claimant under the three
laws.
VII. ABOLISHING THE TRADE
In his annual message to Congress in December of 1806, Thomas
Jefferson, who had long opposed the trade (but not slavery itself)
reminded the nation that on January 1, 1808 the Constitutional
suspension of Congressional power on this issue would finally expire.214
He took a moment in his address to “congratulate” his
fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period at which you may
interpose your authority constitutionally to withdraw the citizens of the
United States from all further participation in those violations of
human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending
inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the
best interests of our country have long been eager to proscribe.215

He also noted that any law passed by Congress could not take effect
until January 1, 1808, but nonetheless he urged Congress to act quickly
“to prevent by timely notice expeditions which can not be completed
before that day.”216 Congress readily complied with legislation to
absolutely ban all importations of slaves after January 1, 1808.217 The
1807 Act was a comprehensive attempt to close the African trade. By
passing the law in March, Congress gave all slave traders nine months to
close down their operations in the United States.

211. See, e.g., Act of March 22, 1794, ch.11, 1 Stat. 347 (1794).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Thomas Jefferson, “Sixth Annual Message” to the United States Congress (Dec. 2, 1806),
in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 396 (1897), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29448.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
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A. The 1807 Act
The ten sections of the 1807 Act were designed to eliminate all
American participation in the trade. Section 1 set the tone.218 After
January 1, 1808 it would
not be lawful to import or bring into the United States or the territories
thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro,
mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of
such [person] . . . as a slave, or to be held to service or labour.219

The act provided an enormous penalty—up to $20,000—for anyone
building a ship for the trade or fitting out an existing ship to be used in
the trade.220
Penalties for participating in the trade varied. American citizens
participating in the trade were subject to fines of up to $10,000 and jail
terms of anywhere from five to ten years.221 Ships of any nation found
in American ports or hovering off the American coast with slaves on
them could be seized and forfeited, with the captain facing a $10,000
fine and up to four years in prison.222 Any American who purchased an
illegally imported slave would lose that slave and be fined $800 for
every slave purchased.223 The law allowed the United States Navy to
interdict ships involved in the illegal trade.224 The law required ships
legally transporting slaves within the United States, from one Southern
slave port to another, to register their cargo with port authorities before
commencing their voyage.225 This section was designed to further
prevent the illegal importation of slaves.
The law certainly had impressive penalties for those who were
convicted of violating it. Fines under the statute were enormous, and the
potential jail time was surely enough to discourage most slave
smugglers.226 Moreover, for the Jefferson administration, which never
much liked federal power, this Act constituted a huge grant of power to
the national government. Had Congress provided sufficient funding to
enforce the law it would have surely closed the trade. Funding the

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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suppression of the trade, would, however, be problematic until the Civil
War.227
There was one other problem with the 1808 law: the disposition of
illegally imported slaves. Logically, illegally imported slaves should
have been either freed in the United States or sent back to Africa. After
all, one of the goals of the law was to end the importation of new slaves
from Africa. Given the views of President Jefferson, and many of the
leaders of his party, neither option was possible.228
President Jefferson was deeply hostile to the presence of free blacks
in the United States.229 In a letter to Edward Coles, shortly after he left
office, Jefferson referred to them as “pests” on society.230 Thus, his
administration had no interest in freeing Africans who were illegally
imported into the nation. Nor was the deeply parsimonious Jefferson
likely to support spending any money on returning the hapless Africans
to their homeland. They may have been sold into an immoral form of
commerce and illegally brought to America as slaves, but at least from
Jefferson’s perspective, that did not mean they should be free.
So, what would the nation do with slaves illegally brought to its
shores? Reflecting Jefferson’s states’ rights ideology, his hatred of free
blacks,231 and his refusal to spend money unless absolutely necessary,
the law provided that any slaves illegally found in the United States
would be treated according to the law of the state in which they were
found—or brought to.232 In practice, this meant the unfortunate Africans
who were illegally taken to the United States would not become free, but
instead would become slaves in some southern state.
Furthermore, the states where these illegally imported Africans
were taken would actually profit from the illegal trade by selling the
Africans. This aspect of the law illustrates that the Jefferson
administration was not antislavery and that it had no concerns about the
immorality of actually enslaving freeborn Africans. Such confiscations
had the triple advantage of discouraging slave smugglers (who would
lose all their cargo), enriching the Southern states which would profit
from the sale of the illegally imported slaves, and also giving individual
Southerners the opportunity to acquire new slaves.

227. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 29, 170.
228. FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at ch. 5-7.
229. Id. at ch. 6-7; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814),
available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=307.
230. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles, supra note 229.
231. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 44, ch. 6-7.
232. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
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Under the law, the United States would gain money from the sale of
confiscated ships and the large fines imposed on anyone involved in the
trade.233 People informing on those who violated the law, as well as the
crews of naval ships that seized traders, would also share in the proceeds
of the sale of ships that were seized.234 Southern states would have the
proceeds from the sale of illegally imported slaves, and Southern slaveowners would have access to a few more slaves. Anticipating the logic
of Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857),235
the Africans themselves would “have no rights,”236 and remain slaves.
In sum, the act of 1807 provided heavy penalties—great disincentives—
for slave traders, but ignored the slaves themselves. They were treated
like merchandise to be transferred from the smuggler to some owner
who could get a clear title to them. The 1807 Act sought to end the
trade, but did nothing to undermine the legitimacy of holding men and
women in bondage. In that respect it truly represented the ideology of
the president who signed it into law.
B. The 1818 Act
In 1818, Congress passed an elaborate new act,237 technically an
amendment to the 1807 law, but really more like a new statute.238 The
new law tinkered with the penalties for various offenses.239 For
example, the maximum fine for fitting out a ship was reduced to $5,000
and the jail time was reduced to no more than seven years.240 The
reduction in penalties probably did not reflect any sense that the trade
was less heinous. Rather, the original penalties were probably out of
line with standards for punishments at the time.
The most significant change in the law was the standard by which
courts would judge those charged under the 1818 act. The new law
shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant.241 The
new law required that defendant “prove that the negro or mulatto, or
person of colour, which he or they shall be charged with having brought
into the United States, or with purchasing . . . was brought into the
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United States at least five years previous to the commencement of such
prosecution.”242 This section of the law created a statute of limitation of
five years on the law banning the trade, but it also made prosecutions
easier within those five years.243 Under this law, anyone in possession
of an African-born slave might have to prove how he came into
possession of that slave, demonstrating the slave was in the United
States at least five years before any prosecution.244 The “African-ness”
of a slave would be prima facie evidence against an owner, to be
rebutted only by contrary evidence the owner had to produce.
C. The 1819 Act
In 1819 Congress passed yet another Act to regulate the slave
trade.245 This law dramatically changed the regulation of the trade.
First, it authorized the president to send “armed vessels of the United
States, to be employed to cruise on any of the coasts of the United States
. . . or the coast of Africa” to interdict slave traders.246 This was the
beginning of what would eventually become known as the African
Squadron, which patrolled the waters off the coast of Africa in an
attempt to stop the slave trade at its source.247 The law also provided
that illegally imported slaves be returned to Africa, rather than being
sold in the United States.248 The Act authorized the president to appoint
agents to receive rescued Africans and return them to the continent of
their birth.249 Shortly after the adoption of this law, the United States
would use Liberia as a destination for Africans taken off of intercepted
ships.250 American ships could now seize slavers off the coast of Africa
and immediately return the slaves to Africa. The law provided an
economic incentive for sailors on these ships. The United States
government promised a $25 bounty, to be shared by the crew of the
interdicting vessel, for every slave rescued from traders.251 The Act also
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provided a bounty of $50 per slave to any informant whose information
led to the recovery of illegally imported slaves.252
This Act changed the direction of the suppression of the trade. The
focus was now, in part, on the injustice of enslaving someone who
deserved to be free. Anyone illegally enslaved would thus be set free.
The law now implicitly condemned American slavery itself. If it was
wrong—unlawful—to enslave an African after 1819, why, someone
might ask, was it not wrong to enslave an African before 1808? And if
the original enslavement was morally wrong, then what was the basis of
holding the descendants of that person in slavery? Had such questions
been raised, they might have led to a full-blown debate over slavery in
the United States. However, no one in Congress seems to have been
concerned about the political and moral implications of this aspect of the
law.
The Act also took the United States out of the business of
marketing slaves. Before 1819, confiscated slaves were sold under the
laws of the states where they ended up.253 Under the earlier laws, naval
crews and informants were partially compensated from the sale of these
slaves.254 Now, the taxpayers compensated naval crews and informants
through bounties and the Africans went home.255 This was a dramatic
change in American policy. For the first time in the nation’s history, the
United States was willing to spend money to help Africans gain their
liberty.
D. The Act of 1820
The final substantive statute to regulate the trade was passed in
1820, with the unlikely title “An Act to continue in force ‘An act to
protect the commerce of the United States, and to punish the crime of
piracy,’ and also to make further provisions for punishing the crime of
piracy.”256 The key elements of the law were two sections declaring that
any American citizen engaging in the African slave trade “shall be
adjudged a pirate; and on conviction thereof before the circuit court of
the United States for the district wherein he shall be brought or found,
shall suffer death.”257 The same language was applied to non-Americans
252. Id. at 534.
253. See An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch.22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807); Act of Apr.
20, 1818, ch.91, 3 Stat. 450 (1818).
254. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch.91, 3 Stat. 450, 451 (1818).
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found on board slavers owned or commissioned by Americans.258 The
statute provided that this penalty was to be in force for only two years,
but on January 3, 1823 Congress made it a permanent statute.259 This
was a dramatic and important change in U.S. policy.
After 1820, participation in the African Slave Trade was to be
considered the most heinous crime on the high seas—piracy—to be
punished by death.260 Never before had the United States taken such a
stand against any aspect of slavery. Enforcement would be a challenge.
The Atlantic Ocean was vast and the African Squadron was always too
small.261 Slavers captured in or near southern ports would be tried by
jurors sympathetic to slavery. These jurors might also not always be
hostile to the illegal import of slaves.262 No slaver would actually be
executed until the Lincoln Administration actually enforced the law to
its fullest.263 But the 1820 law was somewhat effective in curbing the
trade. Few sailors were willing to risk their lives for the relatively paltry
earnings on board a slaver. The high cost of failure—confiscation of a
ship, large fines, jail time for the owner, and possibly execution for the
captain and crew—surely discouraged most would-be traders.264
Incentives for informing on Americans who bought illegally imported
slaves were high.265 At $50.00 a slave, an informant could make $5,000
for tipping off authorities that a mere one hundred Africans had been
secretly and illegally landed.266 At $25.00 a slave, the crews of the
African Squadron had a strong incentive for acting “above and beyond”
the call of duty.267 Even in cases where the slavers were not executed,
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ships were seized and forfeited, making the business very expensive and
not very profitable.268
To be sure, some slaves were smuggled into the United States after
1820. But the risks were high and the numbers were relatively few.269
In an eight-year period from 1800 until December 31, 1807, about
40,000 Africans were forcibly brought into the country.270 This was the
last large importation of slaves into the United States. Between 1808,
when the slave trade ban went into effect, and 1820, when slave trading
was declared piracy, it is possible that as many as 10,000 slaves were
smuggled into the United States.271 After 1820 it is unlikely that more
than 2,500 Africans were illegally brought to the United States, and it
may have been less than that.272 American-born slaves would be
shipped to the Deep South and the Southwest in large numbers, as the
internal slave trade replaced the African trade and hundreds of thousands
of African-American slaves were uprooted and moved further south and
further west.273 The cost of ending that domestic trade–the American
Civil War–would be infinitely higher than ending the African trade.274
But, the moral issue was set in 1819 and 1820 when the United States
finally stated, in unequivocal terms that enslaving people was a “wrong”
and those who engaged in the African trade were no better than common
pirates.275 And, like common pirates, they deserved to be hanged.
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